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Efforts to present valid evidence for perennialist models do not withstand critical scrutiny. 
One strategy common to most versions of perennialism points to perceived patterns in 
reports of spiritual experiences, whether from traditional, clinical, or phenomenological 
accounts as evidence for such an approach; the shortcoming is that these same patterns are 
the basis for perennialist premises. Offering one’s premises as evidence for their conclusions 
is circular reasoning, and does not constitute valid support for an idea. Pointing to 
similarities between reports of spiritual or other transformative experiences is what inspires 
perennialist models, but is not evidence for their validity. Careful consideration is given to 
Wilber’s use of this and other efforts to support his integral perennialisms, with subsequent 
consideration of Studstill’s mystical pluralism and Taylor’s soft perennialism. Perennialist 
models are considered metaphysical because there does not appear to be any way to obtain 
independent evidence with which these appealing notions could be validated, and the 
authors considered here have not achieved effective solutions. However, a review of these 
three separate approaches reveals some similarities in what may be a genre of perennialist 
New Age religion.
Glenn Hartelius
California Institute of Integral Studies 
San Francisco, CA, USA
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Circular Reasoning Is Not the Uroboros:
Rejecting Perennialism as a Psychological Theory
Introduced into psychology by Wilber (1975), perennialism has gained a foothold in subdisciplines such as transpersonal psychology. While Wilber's 
work has received extensive and substantive critique that 
may disqualify it from use in scholarly contexts (e.g., 
Ferrer, 2002, 2011; Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013; Hartelius, 
2015a, 2015b), new versions of perennialist thought 
continue to be put forward. Some of these, following 
Wilber, claim to provide evidence for perennialist 
views. Yet, as with Wilber, these efforts typically rely 
on circular reasoning to support metaphysical claims, 
employ boutique descriptions of conventional terms, and 
overstep bounds of logic and evidence, in service of some 
version of universalizing truth. This paper will critically 
review evidence for perennialist views as put forward 
by Wilber, Studstill, and Taylor, and rebut claims that 
there is valid evidence for perennialism. In this process, 
common factors in what appears to be a particular genre 
of New Age perennialism will be identified.
Wilber's Evidence for Perennialism
Wilber has made various attempts to evade the criticism that his system is metaphysical, yet 
careful consideration of what might be called his integral 
perennialism, suggests that the metaphysical speculation 
at its core may be inseparable from this approach. Using 
a blend of complex circular reasoning, ideological 
conviction, and privileged knowledge, his perennialist 
theories typically offer their premises as evidence for 
their conclusions. While it is worthwhile to examine 
reports of subtle phenomena associated with mystical 
and spiritual experiences, and to consider whether these 
might prove amenable to some form of crosscultural 
inquiry that is less encumbered by the assumptions of 
conventional empiricism (Ferrer, 2009, 2014), integral 
perennialism is too flawed to credibly serve in this 
role. Wilber’s integral theory, as a creative product of 
the religious imagination, may prove appealing and 
inspiring to popular audiences (cf. Hartelius, 2015a), 
but it should not be advanced as work that meets the 
standards of scientific scholarship. 
 Perennialism generally, and Wilber’s work in 
particular, has been the subject of numerous critiques 
(e.g., Falk, 2009; Ferrer, 1998, 2002, 2009; Rothberg 
& Kelly, 1998). Prior papers have focused in part on 
establishing that Wilber’s work remains perennialist 
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in nature despite revision (Hartelius, 2015a, 2015b; 
Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013). Here I develop the argument 
that Wilber’s integral thought remains an inescapably 
metaphysical proposition partially obscured by defective 
approaches to evidence, and hence not a psychology in 
any formal, scholarly, or scientific sense of the term.
 Metaphysics has several meanings. In popular 
usage it refers to topics such as esoteric teachings, based 
on an erroneous translation of the term as pointing to 
that which is transcendent or beyond (meta) the physical; 
hence, metaphysical bookstores are commonly ones that 
offer works on magic, the occult, crystal healing, and so 
forth. This popular etymology is incorrect, since the term 
derives from meta ta physica, referring to one of Aristotle’s 
works that was located after (meta) his work entitled, 
Physics; in this meaning, metaphysics refers to the topic 
of that book, namely statements on being, existence, 
and first principles (Gifford, 2015). There is also a third 
relevant definition, in which metaphysics (2015) refers 
to speculations that cannot be subjected to scientific 
inquiry or empirical verification—a definition that for 
most purposes conveniently encompasses the first two. 
This last definition is the most relevant in demonstrating 
how integral perennialism necessarily fails as anything 
beyond an inspiring exercise in meaning making through 
metaphysical speculation.
 Within the field of transpersonal psychology, 
perennialism (e.g., Wilber, 2000a, 2006) has moved 
from dominant paradigm (Needleman & Eisenberg, 
1987; Rothberg, 1986)  to a more contested status 
(Ferrer, 2011) in the face of critiques that it tries to 
remedy the Western mind-body split by merely tacking 
on speculations about a transcendent spiritual dimension 
(e.g., Ferrer, 2002, 2009). In addition to Ferrer, other 
critics have claimed that appealing to hidden or 
undemonstrable  causes makes this model unsuitable for 
scholarship (Hartelius, 2015a), and have pointd out that 
failure to resolve the Cartesian divide between mind and 
matter, or subject and object, reduces its usefulness for 
understanding mystical, spiritual, and other exceptional 
human experiences (Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013). 
 Perennialism begins with a conventional 
objective understanding of the world and attempts 
to add an interior dimension that fuses conventional 
psychological development with postulated mystical 
and spiritual ranges of attainment; it uses this 
approach for individuals as well as for human cultures 
(cf. Wilber, 1979, 2000a, 2006). Resolution of these 
largely incompatible objective and subjective schemas 
is proposed by suggesting that they both emerge from 
a nondual spiritual ultimate that is beyond sensory 
apprehension; the existence of this nondual ultimate is 
evidenced mainly by interpreting accounts from various 
spiritual traditions as if they were all references to this 
same ultimate, with the numerous differences in their 
reports attributed to diversities of cultural situation. 
 Critics have noted that if this ultimate is 
problematically taken to be the unchanging goal of 
human spiritual aspiration, regardless of cultural 
situation, then it has qualities that are consistent with 
objectivity, even though it is deemed to be the source 
of both objective and subjective aspects of the world 
(Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013). One might imagine this as 
a sandwich model reality: the top slice of bread is the 
objective physical exterior of the world, as conventionally 
described by science. Underneath this is a subjective 
interior—the filling of the sandwich—psychological and 
spiritual in humans but shared by everything that has an 
exterior. Yet if one explores the depths of subjectivity one 
arrives at the bottom slice of bread, the nondual ultimate. 
 One might say that a perennialist model 
accepts the common notion that equates objectivity 
with reality, and then redeems the reality of mind and 
experience by giving it an objective source: a nondual 
ultimate. However, this is only achieved by proposing 
a transcendent universal cause. This move creates the 
paradoxical idea of an ultimate source that is both 
objective in nature and beyond the reach of scientific 
inquiry, and subjects perennialism to valid critiques that 
it is a metaphysical system rather than a scientific one.
 Once his work had been called out as 
metaphysical, Wilber initiated a series of revisions that 
could be seen as attempting to retain his method and 
his conclusions, but evade this critique. However, given 
that metaphysical speculation supported by circular 
reasoning and elite perception remains at the heart of 
Wilber’s (2000a, 2006) perennialist model, it seems 
doubtful that perennialism is possible without such a 
strategy. 
 Beginning with experiential realities—sensory, 
mental, and spiritual—Wilber posited that there were 
regularities in the way that consciousness developed 
within individuals and cultures. This proposed pattern 
was his premise, his proposition, which served as the 
basis for his conclusion that consciousness emerged into 
the world from a nondual spiritual ultimate. So far, so 
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good—much scientific work begins with the detection 
of possibly meaningful patterns, along with theories of 
what such a pattern might mean.
 However, describing a pattern that is consistent 
with a particular theory is not enough to demonstrate 
the veracity of the theory. For example, in 2005, Bobby 
Henderson sent a tongue-in-cheek letter to the Kansas 
School Board advocating for the teaching of Flying 
Spaghetti Monsterism—a theory that the universe 
was created by an invisible Flying Spaghetti Monster 
(FSM)—in school curricula as an alternative to evolution 
and the Christian-inspired theory of intelligent design 
(e.g., Dembski & Colson, 2004; Forrest & Gross, 2007). 
At the time the Board was under pressure to include 
intelligent design, and Henderson’s letter was designed to 
illustrate the fact that once you open the academic door 
to one metaphysical explanation, it becomes difficult to 
make a case for excluding other explanations that are 
equally without independent evidence.
 One of the pieces of evidence offered by 
Henderson in his letter demonstrates how simple it is 
to use a pattern of observable facts as pseudo-evidence 
for a favored theory. He noted that it was disrespectful 
to teach his beliefs without wearing the chosen outfit 
of the FSM—full pirate regalia—and that He (the 
FSM) would become angry if this were not done. As 
evidence for this claim he argued that global warming 
and other natural disasters were caused by a decline 
in the number of pirates since the 1800s, and offered 
a graph demonstrating an inverse relationship between 
the number of pirates in the world (declining) and global 
average temperatures (rising). While this graph provided 
evidence that was consistent with Henderson’s theory, its 
intentional absurdity pointed to the weakness of such 
patterns alone as evidence. Merely showing that there is 
a pattern of facts that can be interpreted in a way that is 
consistent with a theory is not valid evidence.
 What is required to validate a theory is additional, 
independent evidence. For example, in a noteworthy 
coincidence, around the time that Henderson first 
published his deliberate pseudo-evidence (2005), there 
was a sudden rise in incidences of piracy in international 
waters surrounding Somalia. While believers in the FSM 
might argue with mock sincerity that this was because He 
had been revealed to the world, this fact offered a unique 
opportunity to test Henderson’s claim. By Henderson’s 
logic, it would be possible to predict that this spike in 
piracy would cause global average temperatures to fall—
which of course they did not. The point here is that in 
order to validate the relationship between a pattern of 
observed evidence and some theory about what that 
pattern might mean, it is necessary to formulate and test 
predictions based on the associated theory. 
 Of course, Wilber has offered evidence for his 
model—evidence that comes directly from empirical 
descriptions of experiential realities in the literatures of 
psychology and spiritual traditions. The shortcoming of 
this evidence is that it is identical with the material that 
served as the basis for his premise. In place of obtaining 
separate evidence, Wilber has taken the pattern he 
claimed to find in various facts (his premise) and offered 
it as evidence for his conclusion—a model of unfolding 
consciousness arising from a nondual ultimate. As 
noted, this is circular reasoning, a process that does not 
generate evidence no matter how many times it goes 
round and round. 
 Circular reasoning is a shortcoming, an obvious 
and serious defect in evidence—one that deserves to be 
faced soberly. All of the evidence typically offered for 
perennialism—experiential reports, phenomenological 
studies, quantitative studies using self-report measures, 
religious texts, anthropological accounts, and so forth—
falls within this circularity rather than relieving it. All 
of these sources of evidence are different types of reports 
of experience, and as such are the basis for the premise 
of perennialism; they cannot also be valid independent 
evidence that confirms this premise. Nor can patterns 
described within one such category be used to verify a 
similar pattern perceived in another category, because 
they are the same class of evidence. Claims to this effect 
are akin to imagining that a hearsay account can be used 
to confirm a rumor, when in fact hearsay and rumor 
are both similar forms of information that require 
independent verification. Given that there is as yet no 
independent evidence for perennialism, claims that any 
one of the categories of data is evidence for the accuracy 
of perennialism is an instance of circular reasoning.
 This fallacy emerges as a clear and potentially 
fatal flaw to the perennialist enterprise. While it is 
typical for proponents of such views to distract from 
weaknesses in perennialism ingenious ways, circular 
reasoning cannot be evaded or elevated. Not even 
mystical images of circularity such as the uroboros—a 
snake that swallows its own tail—will transform circular 
reasoning into a numinous asset for perenniaism within 
the context of psychology. 
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 An example of this circularity, along with efforts 
to sidestep its weakness, can be observed in Wilber's 
(2000a) introduction of his integral model:  
It should be realized from the start that these levels 
and sublevels presented by the perennial sages are not 
the product of metaphysical speculation or abstract 
hairsplitting philosophy. In fact, they are in almost 
every way the codifications of direct experiential 
realities, reaching from sensory experience to mental 
experience to spiritual experience. … Moreover, the 
discovery of these waves, over the years, has been 
communally generated and consensually validated. 
The fact that wherever they appear, they are often 
quite similar, sometimes almost identical, simply 
tells us that we live in a patterned Kosmos, and these 
richly textured patterns can be—and were—spotted 
by intelligent men and women in almost every 
culture. (p. 8; emphasis in original)
In the same breath that Wilber (2000a) claimed his cate-
gories are “not the product of metaphysical speculation” 
(p. 8), he outlined a process that constitutes precisely 
this kind of speculation: identification of a hypothetical 
pattern that is consistent with a theory for which no 
independent evidence can be obtained. It matters not 
whether the premise arises from abstract theory or 
from empirical studies of experience, nor how large the 
database of facts from which the pattern is deduced, nor 
whether the alleged pattern was proposed by one person 
or by a thousand; what matters is that one’s premise 
cannot be advanced as evidence for one’s conclusion, 
and tentative interpretations of patterns that cannot be 
verified by independent evidence constitute metaphysical 
speculation.
 While circular reasoning is a defect in 
argument, circular propositions are not always wrong. If 
the premise is true, as evidenced by other means, then 
the conclusion may also be true even if the premise does 
not itself constitute proper evidence for the conclusion. 
For example, if I claim that large stones weigh many 
pounds because they are heavy, the statement may be 
true even though it uses circular reasoning. But when 
there is no separate evidence, such as the ability to 
place a boulder on a scale, then the conclusion must 
remain as a speculation—and speculations that cannot 
be submitted to a process of separate evidence are, by 
definition, metaphysical speculations. Since there is no 
separate evidence for Wilber’s theory, other than the data 
from which the pattern was surmised, his perennialist 
theory—as well as every other version of perennialism—
necessarily remains metaphysical speculation. The fact 
that other individuals in other ages and cultures have 
noticed similar patterns—Wilber’s (2000a) so-called 
“perennial sages” (p. 8)—confirms the appeal of this 
interpretation but adds no evidence for the correctness 
of perennialist speculations.
 To draw an example from history, a similar 
kind of metaphysical speculation has been suggested as 
the inspiration of the cult of Mithras, a Roman mystery 
religion that appeared around the 1st century B.C.E. and 
survived for a few centuries (Ulansey, 1991). Around 128 
B.C.E. the Greek astronomer Hipparchus discovered 
that the astrological location of the Spring equinox—
considered the starting point of the year—had moved 
from the constellation of Taurus to the constellation 
of Aries. This phenomenon is now understood as the 
precession of the equinoxes, in which the Spring equinox 
rotates around the celestial horizon approximately once 
every 26,000 years. 
 In the view of Hipparchus’ time, however, the 
cosmos was centered on the Earth and immoveable; if 
the cosmos had shifted, then this must mean that there 
was a force greater than the cosmos, capable of creating 
this shift (Ulansey, 1991). Looking to astrological 
explanations, this move out of the constellation of 
Taurus was interpreted as the end of the Age of the 
Bull. Mithras, the slayer of the Bull in a Persian legend, 
was apparently identified as the transcendent force that 
was capable of moving the very cosmos in this way. 
The cult of Mithras then sought to do homage to this 
great power, the logical conclusion to an inspiring line 
of metaphysical imagination. Note that the existence 
of Mithras as a supremely powerful force was deduced 
from the movement of the Spring equinox, and after this 
force had been postulated, the movement of the equinox 
then served as evidence of his existence. The approach in 
this case was to posit a hidden force in order to explain 
observable facts, and then use those observable facts as 
evidence for the hidden cause. While this sort of circular 
reasoning may be a perfectly fine way to found a religion, 
its utility in science has yet to be demonstrated.
 Given that it seems unlikely there can be 
independent evidence for the correctness of perennialist 
theories any more than there is for Mithras, integral 
perennialism remains an approach inherently constituted 
on metaphysical speculation—a shortcoming it is 
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unlikely to transcend. One might argue that affirming 
the reality of human spirituality is so important that 
permitting metaphysics into scholarship in this one area 
is justified. However, as demonstrated by Henderson’s 
(2005) letter of appeal to the Kansas School Board, once 
one such metaphysical cause is allowed, there is no way 
to exclude any number of other potential hidden causes 
and no evidence-based way to discriminate between 
various theoretical agencies. Perhaps the stock market 
rises because Nanabozho the trickster deity is pleased, 
or maybe an earthquake in Greece was caused by Zeus 
making love with Hera after a long separation. Perhaps 
metaphysics are beyond the reach of evidence because 
the Flying Spaghetti Monster wishes it so.
 However, this critique addresses only the 
process of discerning a pattern among reports of 
spiritual experience and using the pattern as evidence 
for validating itself. There is also the argument of 
radical empricism, an idea proffered by James (1912). 
James' vision proposed a sort of phenomenology by 
another name, in which the world should be analyzed 
as discrete elements of experience in relationship with 
each other. He held that the relations between these 
elements should be as important as the elements 
themselves. He also held consciousness as an obvious 
and necessary element in any experience, and in this 
sense offered a system that spanned the typical Cartesian 
divide between the experience of inner and outer. 
 While a Jamesian radical empiricism theore-
tically allows inner experience to be included as 
empirical data, what James (1912) put forward was an 
aspirational view rather than a ready research method. 
Qualitative methods do study reports of personal 
experience systematically, but these are subject to the 
various ways experiences are reported by individuals 
with different histories, educations, temperaments, and 
different contexts of culture and language. Variation 
may sit even more deeply, since environment may shape 
not just experience, but the architecture of the brain 
itself (e.g., McEwen, 2012). While radical empiricism 
offers potential validity to inner experience, the task of 
comparing experiential data across numerous traditions 
in an effective and reliable way remains at very early 
stages. This means that, as already noted, evidence for 
perennialism remains reliant on identifying patterns 
in reports of spiritual experience. As yet, neither 
these perceived patterns, nor the reports from which 
they are drawn, can be independently validated. The 
personal experience of an individual may convince that 
person of some particular philosophical or religious 
view. However, experiential reports do not resolve the 
problematic circular reasoning that currently underpins 
perennialist views. Perceived patterns in such reports 
serve as the basis for the premises of perennialism; these 
same perceived patterns cannot be used as evidence for 
the validity of such patterns.
 Wilber’s approach, then, in simple terms, 
is one of pasting together a collage of snippets from 
vastly different contexts, describing patterns that he 
has perceived within these, varnishing the results with 
a coat of integral theory, and then offering them as 
valid evidence for an idealized construct drawn from 
these same patterns. This strategy has been identified 
as characteristic of New Age religion, as described by 
Hammer (2001):
Bits and pieces of non-Western traditions are 
disembedded from their original religious contexts. 
Through an incessant bricolage carried out by 
leading religious virtuosi, these fragments are re-
embedded in a modern, Western esoteric religious 
setting. The principal mechanism of doing this, is by 
forcing these exotic elements into a fairly rigid, pre-
existing interpretive mould. Thereby, to the believer, 
the same message does indeed seem to come from 
everywhere. (p. 56).
As an avenue of evidence, this is no more reliable than 
what holds together a conspiracy theory, or reads signs 
that an unrequited love is destined to succeed into 
newspaper horoscopes or everyday events. 
 Transpersonal scholars such as Daniels (2001) 
and Ferrer (2002) have pointed to the liabilities of 
metaphysical positions, and Friedman (2002) has called 
for a wholesale ban on these within transpersonal 
psychology. While the latter may be impracticable in the 
short term within a field that found its early and middle 
footing on Wilber’s (e.g., 1975, 1979, 1981, 1984a, 1984b) 
consistently metaphysical theories, a worthy first step 
would be to acknowledge such musings as metaphysical. 
To this end, it is unhelpful that Wilber has continued to 
obfuscate the shortcomings of his perennialist model by 
strategies such as distancing himself from perennialism 
(Wilber, 1997), denying that his notions are metaphysical 
speculations (Wilber, 2000a), and most recently joining 
in the critique of metaphysics while claiming his work 
to be post-metaphysical (Wilber, 2006)—stances that 
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depend on carefully tailored and limited definitions of 
perennialism and metaphysics that inaccurately exempt 
Wilber’s work from these categories (Ferrer, 2009; 
Hartelius, 2015a).
 In addition to acknowedging metaphysical 
visions as speculative, transpersonal approaches can 
also support advances by seeking independent evidence 
for its theories (cf. Friedman, 2002, 2015). This is not 
a facile call for objective empirical evidence, in the 
spirit of debunkers who would marginalize or trivialize 
transpersonal as unscientific or dangerous (Ellis, 1986, 
1989; Ellis & Yeager, 1989; Kurtz, 1991; Shermer, 
approaches that consider only changes in chemistry or 
biology or physiological structure may overlook other 
factors that could be of equal value. Contemporary 
research in medicine and psychiatry, which still focuses 
primarily on object-like variables, might have as 
much to gain from the consideration of relational and 
participatory models as does the study of mystical and 
spiritual phenomena.
 What must be firmly excluded from the list 
of conducive methods is the elitist notion advanced 
by Wilber (e.g., 1984c, 1999) and members of the 
traditionalist school of perennial philosophy such as 
René Guénon and Fritjof Schuon, that the ultimate 
evidence for their metaphysical schemas comes from 
direct experiential apprehension of transcendent 
realities. While there is no need to question the validity 
of mystical experiences in themselves, the sensate 
phenomena of the experience are not the same as the 
meanings attached to them. If I am walking through 
the desert in midday heat, the fact that I see something 
shimmering ahead of me (the sensate experience) 
does not mean that I see a lake (one possible attached 
meaning). To claim that one can directly apprehend 
transcendent realities is to conflate the particular 
qualities of the experience with some specific attached 
meaning, which may or may not be accurate pending 
some sort of independent evidence.
 For Wilber (1984c) this claim of experiential 
validation was couched as the eye of contemplation, the 
highest capacity of mind, that elevated one to knowledge 
of realities that happen to be identical with Wilber’s 
theories. In circular fashion, how much this higher eye 
was open in any given individual seemed to depend 
directly on how much they agreed with Wilber’s ideas. 
While the eye of contemplation has disappeared from 
Wilber’s (2006) latest major work, the argument of 
privileged knowledge  by elite knowers remains central; 
this is an authoritarian argument by other means that 
should not be confused with evidence.
 In scientific research converging evidence from 
separate lines of inquiry adds confidence to findings; 
multiple lines of specious reasoning are not additive in 
the same way. Metaphysical models based on reading 
patterns into cultural or experiential data do not 
receive additional weight or confirmation on account of 
agreement by respected figures for whom authoritative 
knowledge is claimed. Accordingly, Wilber’s integral 
approach is a complex theoretical construction for 
2002), or who would ridicule the possibility of any 
human capacities that fail to conform to conventional 
materialist expectations (e.g., Charpak, Broch, Holland, 
& Randi, 2005). The phenomena of mystical and 
spiritual and other exceptional human experiences are 
often subtle and ephemeral events (Ferrer, 2009) that 
require conducive inquiry methods capable of eliciting 
these and being present to notice their character and 
qualities, and perhaps even structure, without disrupting 
(cf. Hartelius, 2007, 2015c). An approach that sees only 
insubstantial subjective imaginings or else object-like 
things that can be scrutinized under the harsh lights of a 
simplistic materialism (cf. Ferrer, 2002, 2014; Strawson, 
2006) may impose metaphysical assumptions commonly 
embedded in scientific endeavors (Ferrer, 2014), thereby 
prematurely dismissing these phenomena. 
 For example, if mystical and spiritual phenomena 
are better understood as relational or participatory 
processes (cf. Ferrer, 2008) rather than either just 
inner experiences or external objects that conventional 
approaches are designed to research, then such methods 
may be inadequate—a shortcoming that may be 
projected onto these phenomena. One would hardly be 
surprised if a noisy expedition into wildlands failed to 
find elusive species; it would be more disconcerting if 
the explorers used this methodological shortcoming as 
evidence that such animals did not exist. 
 Relational or participatory models may also 
have value for psychology in areas other than the study 
of  exceptional human experiences; there is evidence that 
long term outcomes in certain severe mental disorders 
such as schizophrenia may be significantly affected by 
cultural factors (Mehl-Madrona, Jul, & Mainguy, 2014). 
If some mental disorders are in part relational patterns 
co-created within culture, rather than solely biological 
conditions requiring pharmacological intervention, then 
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which there is no independent evidence, rather than 
a psychological theory in any conventional sense (cf. 
Friedman, 2002, 2015). As such, it seems unlikely 
to advance the project of recovering knowledge from 
spiritual experiences, practices, and traditions for use in 
the context of academic scholarship.
 To bring this argument current, the error in 
Wilber’s (2006) so-called post-metaphysical position 
is the assertion that his process of circular reasoning, 
allegedly confirmed or even constructed by elite 
seekers, somehow constitutes “some version of ... 
objective evidence” (p. 234); this evidence supposedly 
places it apart from metaphysics and above the world’s 
spiritual traditions. In fact it matters little whether 
Wilber’s (2006) “Kosmic habits”—the alleged levels 
of consciousness created by spiritual pioneers and then 
“etched into the Kosmos” (p. 246) for future generations 
to navigate—are pre-existing or co-constructed. The 
only evidence for these levels is circular reasoning 
and the opinion of supposedly elite knowers; there is 
no independent evidence, and no version whatsoever 
of objective evidence, for these claims. Wilber’s ideas 
have been branded as metaphysical since at least the 
1980s (Needleman & Eisenberg, 1987; Schneider, 
1987, 1989), in the sense that they posit notions that 
are not amenable to scientific inquiry, and no volume of 
complex argument can obscure this simple fact. To raise 
the stakes, as Wilber has done, and claim that this ad 
hoc system of analysis creates results that are superior to 
all the spiritual traditions of the world, is bold at best. 
At worst, it fosters unsound and elitist approaches to 
evidence for these phenomena (cf. Hartelius, 2015d).
 Perennialist approaches, by their very nature, 
posit elusive spiritual phenomena based on patterns in 
observable data in the time-honored tradition of human 
religious imagination. Their proponents follow in the 
footsteps of the so-called perennial sages—not a tradition 
as Wilber would rewrite it, but the visionary here and 
there whose creative reach for a larger understanding 
flowed in a similar vein as Wilber’s. Rather than a 
universal truth gleaned by Wilber and his colleagues, 
integral theory may be more of an ingenious synthesis 
drawn from a hundred inventive seers and thinkers 
whose innovations inspired, and continue to inspire. 
These are gifts that deserve to be honored, but honored 
as art and religion, not uncritically recast as science, not 
elevated as an elite esoteric tradition, not touted as a way 
to resolve science and spirit. 
Contemporary Evidence for Perennialism:
Studstill's Mystical Pluralism 
and Taylor's Soft Perennialism
Since the development of Wilber's integral theory, a number of additional authors have attempted to 
advance new lines of evidence for a perennialist position; 
some of these deserve brief examination to determine 
whether any real advances have been made in identifying 
critically sound evidence for such perspectives. Studstill's 
(2005) mystical pluralism and Taylor's (2016) soft 
perennialism will be considered here. Taylor's work is 
represented as part of ongoing dialogue with the author, 
and Studstill's has been selected because it delves into 
careful and detailed comparison between two traditions 
as evidence for its perennialist ideas. After this, the 
outlines of a genre of perennialist New Age religion will 
be offered.
Studstill's Mystical Pluralism
 An inventive version of perennialism has 
been advanced by Studstill (2005), who has attempted 
to reframe his approach as essentialist rather than 
perennialist—though it is both. Strictly speaking, 
Studstill’s work pertains most specifically to the study of 
mysticism, while the context here is that of psychology. He 
has rejected strictly constructivist views on the grounds 
that these define mystical experiences solely as products 
of various contexts and deny any meaningful coherence 
in such phenomena across cultures; this, in turn, strikes 
at the reality of these experiences and undercuts the 
validity of claims regarding their significance. Conversely, 
if mystical experiences do reflect access to something 
beyond conventional reality, then it becomes difficult to 
explain their great variety. In seeking cross-traditional 
understandings of these phenomena, Studstill has 
acknowledged that intra-traditional views are inadequate 
since these are constructed to serve the specific beliefs and 
goals of some particular community; Studstill affirmed 
that any contemporary approach of mysticism would need 
to be couched within a scientific understanding of how 
the human mind works. 
 Studstill’s (2005) mystical pluralist frame 
proposes that mystical experiences lead to similar 
transformative shifts in state of consciousness through 
“encounters with the Real” (p. 20), where what Studstill 
meant by the Real is his own particular account of the 
nature of absolute, ultimate reality. Studstill's solution 
can be summarized as follows: Mystical experiences 
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disrupt the conventional egoic mental state and “induce 
a structural transformation of consciousness” (p. 6) by 
means of “an increasingly sensitized awareness/knowledge 
of Reality” (p. 7). This transformation is a deconstruction 
of cognitive conditioning that sustains an ordinary 
awareness of oneself and the world, and cultivation of an 
attitude of trust.
 Reality, for Studstill (2005), is not an objective 
transcendent dimension, but an experience of Reality 
that more closely approximates its objective character as a 
transcendent dimension. In this light, conventional states 
of mind would provide a deluded reflection of Reality, 
whereas mystical states would offer a relatively more 
accurate view. The benefit of this view is that it affirms 
mystical experiences as more real than the mundane mental 
states of those who dismiss them as social constructions.   
 While Studstill (2005) has offered articulate 
framings of inherent challenges in the study of mysticism, 
his solutions are built on questionable definitions and 
applications of key concepts. For example, for Studstill, 
essentialism is the notion that things of the same sort 
"share some type of common characteristic" (p. 8). This 
broad definition makes it sound as if his approach to 
mysticism should be seen as no different than grouping 
objects such as books or clouds or mammals, which is a 
considerable oversimplification. Essentialism claims that 
some propeties are essential or necessary to an object, 
whereas others are accidental (Robertson & Atkins, 2016); 
other than in maximalist essentialism, which claims that 
every property of an object is essential to it, a simple way 
of determining what is necessary is to compare an object 
with others of the same type. For example, if I have a red 
plastic ball and a blue plastic ball, it is easy to notice that 
color is not essential to plastic ball. Essentialism in this 
example is a claim that shared properties in a particular 
context are more important than those that differ.
 Yet essentialism functions differently in various 
philosophical frames. In the plastic ball example one 
might add a red woolen scarf to the set, and then argue 
that in considering red things, the red plastic ball might 
belong with the red scarf rather than with the blue plastic 
ball; in this context it would be redness that is an essential 
property of the ball. Within a constructivist or relational 
philosophy, essentialism can be a pragmatic, flexible, and 
contextually informed approach to various ways that 
different phenomena have something in common. 
 Essentialism functions quite differently in a naive 
realist frame that assumes a separate and objective external 
reality. In this context essentialism is a claim that there are 
necessary qualities of an object or phenomenon that are 
ontologically, objectively, and immutably true, regardless 
of context or relationship to an observer. Since this claim is 
conjecture, and cannot be demonstrated with independent 
evidence,  it constitutes a metaphysical claim. For example, 
the experience of redness results not from an object, but 
from how the wavelength of light reflected by the surface 
of an object interacts with the cones of the retina, and how 
neural  signals from the cones are interpreted in the visual 
cortex. An essentialist view of redness in a naive realist 
context would claim that a red plastic ball continues to be 
red even when it is in total darkness, or when bathed in 
blue light that it cannot reflect—that is, that the redness is 
inherent rather than the product of interactions between 
the ball's surface, light, and a sighted observer. 
 Another characteristic of essentialist views in the 
frame of naive realism is that they are at times justified by 
appeal to the fact that the entire process of knowing, absent 
naive realist metaphysical claims as criteria for evaluation, 
would devolve into meaningless relativism (Nussbaum, 
1992). Yet relativism, like naive realism, seems to assume 
a world that is separate from the person or object, one 
in which any relationship—or no relationship at all—is 
possible; everything seems to exist, and every choice or 
action appears to be made, in the interconnected context 
of many specific relationships that have actual impact.In 
this matrix, located decisions and relationships seem quite 
capable of proceeding based on local knowledge—since 
it would be difficult to argue that accurate, uniform, and 
universal knowledge guides any great portion of human 
activity. The fictive bogeyman of meaningless relativism 
that naive realism at times uses as justification for its 
retreat into undemonstrable metaphysical claims, seems 
unconvincing. 
 With this background it becomes clear that 
Studstill (2005) has offered a seemingly innocuous defini-
tion of essentialism as it might function in a constructivist 
or relational context, but what he has applied to the 
problem of mysticicm is a naive realist essentialism, 
complete with an argument that such metaphysical claims 
are the only alternative to a meaningless relativism. This 
is not to say that Studstill (2005) has ignored possible 
distinctions within essentialism. He has identified a 
number of different types of essentialism based on 
topics to which essentialism may be applied within the 
cross-cultural study of mysticism: phenomenological 
(similarities in mystical experience), doctrinal (common 
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core doctrines), epistemological (revealing of a single 
divine reality), cognitive (identical psychological 
impact), and therapeutic or soteriological (effects are 
similarly beneficial). While these distinctions may be 
helpful, Studstill's (2005) identification of his work with 
only epistemological and therapeutic esssentialism is 
illuminating. Consideration of therapeutic essentialism is 
beyond the scope of the present discussion; more relevant 
here is Studstill's (2005) epistemological essentialism, 
which is a radically metaphysical claim that all mystical 
experiences "are nevertheless oriented toward a common 
Reality" (p. 9)—a position consistent with a naive realist 
approach, and with perennialist philosophy. 
 It is noteworthy that Studstill (2005) has 
identified as perennialist only doctrinal essentialism, 
which his mystical pluralism omits. Without argument or 
evidence, he has separated epistemological essentialism—
which is central to his approach—from perennialism. Yet 
if one considers the words of Steuco, who gave perennial 
philosophy its name in the 16th century, it is difficult to 
maintain this distinction: 
"Reason, as well as the proofs of many races and of 
much literature, bear witness to the fact that there is 
one principle of all things and that there has been as 
such one and the same knowledge about it among all 
men." (Celenza, 2007, p. 91)
In this description, the original author of the perennial 
philosophy clearly included philosophical assumptions 
regarding the nature of reality; indeed, perennialism 
could hardly be a philosophy without these. If one 
relies on any conventional definition of perennialism, 
Studstill's (2005) category of epistemological essentialism 
should also be identified with this philosophy, as should 
his work, which is clearly perennialist in nature. 
 Having shown that Studstill's (2005) mystical 
pluralism is a version of metaphysically grounded 
perennialism, it remains to consider what evidence he 
has offered in support of this project. The intuition that 
there might be some commonality behind mystical 
experience arises from seeming similarities: If there 
are numerous accounts of some shifted relationship 
to reality, are there then dimensions of existence that 
can only be apprehended under particular conditions? 
Even apart from potential spiritual value, the topic is 
fascinating in much the way a mystery or detective 
novel might be. The tantalizing premise of a hidden 
reality rests on the same resonances that place these 
experiences in the same category. What Studstill 
has offered is a respectable yet selective account of 
Dzogchen Buddhism and 13-14th century German 
mysticism that emphasizes points of similarity in their 
doctrines and accounts of how their practice transforms 
consciousness. These similarities are then offered as 
support for Studstill's (2005) mystical pluralism.
 There are several problems with this evidence, 
the first and simplest being that, as with Wilber, 
Studstill (2005) has offered an articulation of evidence 
for the premise as evidence for his conclusion, so that 
his case is built on circular reasoning. Similarities 
between traditions cannot simultaneously be grounds 
for the premise, and the evidence that the premise 
is correct. If I bought a used car and it broke down 
two days after the purchase, I might suspect that the 
seller had withheld information about its mechanical 
problems. The car's breakdown would be the basis for 
my suspicion, which is my premise. I could not also 
use the  same mechanical failure, or even a subsequent 
failure, as evidence that my initial suspicion was 
correct, without being guilty of circular reasoning. 
I would need to find some other specific evidence in 
order to confirm my suspicion in a valid way, such as 
a note in the glovebox documenting that a mechanic 
had diagnosed the problems leading to the breakdown 
before the sale of the car. Any approach that appeals 
to similarities between traditions as its evidence for 
a perennialist model, including Studstill, is using 
circular reasoning, which is insufficient in a scholarly 
or scientific setting. 
 Nor does Studstill's (2005) appeal to systems 
theory mitigate this problem. Complex systems do call 
for more complex approaches, and he is not wrong 
in noting that cognitive theory, as an example, relies 
broadly on a computer metaphor. However, his claim 
that the complexity of a system removes the necessity of 
independent empirical evidence is incorrect. Cognitive 
models are not merely constructed as metaphors and 
then adopted, they are used to make testable predictions. 
It is only when a model is able to predict in ways that 
can be verified that it gains credence. Studstill's (2005) 
mystical pluralism does not, and likely cannot, meet 
this basic test. 
 An additional issue is that Studstill (2005) 
has used argument for the existence of a particular 
phenomenon—a cross-cultural pattern of change in 
consciousness—as evidence of his explanation for that 
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phenomenon: that this similarity is due to a discrete 
and objective ultimate reality revealed only by certain 
mystical experiences that concur with his definition 
of that reality. It cannot be mystical experiences 
themselves that suggest this solution; rather, given the 
great variety in which such experiences occur, it must 
be that Studstill has correctly discerned which among 
these reflect ultimate Reality the most transparently. 
Even if one agreed that there is a uniform process of 
transformation of consciousness across at least these 
two traditions, this would not serve as anything 
approaching evidence for the rather bold claim that out 
of the myriad definitions of reality throughout human 
culture and across time, Studstill's metaphysical claim is 
privileged knowlege of the one version that is ultimately 
true and correct.  
 Studstill's (2005) perennialist vision might be 
useful hermeneutically for some individuals seeking 
meaning in a therapeutic context. Other than this, 
the fact that it remains rooted in metaphysical 
assumptions, and that its efforts to provide evidence 
for its stance rely on circular reasoning, are sufficient 
to make it as unsuitable for psychology as Wilber's 
integral perennialism. It matters little that Studstill has 
labelled his work essentialist rather than perennialist, 
or that he has done a thoughtful comparison of two 
specific traditions; the flaws in critical  structure and 
evidence required for psychology remain central and 
unresolved. His work offers no advances in evidence 
for a perennialist model.
Taylor's Soft Perennialism
 An equally ingenious version of perennialism 
has been advanced by Taylor (2016). This has been 
considered in some detail elsewhere (Hartelius, 2016, 
2017), but a brief review is warranted here. For Taylor 
(2016), the origin of all spiritual experience in every 
human society and tradition is encounter with an all-
pervasive spiritual force that is the foundation rather 
than the goal of spiritual development. This force is the 
source out of which all the world arises, the essence of 
everything and everyone, yet something that can be 
directly experienced in expanded states of being. Various 
traditions experience this all-pervasive spiritual force 
differently, and come to name and describe it in a variety 
of ways. This range of potential experience that underlies 
and shapes the various traditions might be conceived of 
as a vast landscape where there are many paths and many 
destinations, but all arising out of engagement with this 
all-pervasive spiritual force, which may or may not be 
ultimate. Yet because it is separate from those traditions 
that it informs, this force can also be experienced apart 
from any spiritual tradition. 
 This is Taylor's (2016, 2017) openly  meta-
physical and perennialist explanatory framework for 
the phenomenon that some individuals report durable 
psychological transformations in contexts apart from 
any religious tradition or spiritual practice—shifts 
that seems resonant with some accounts of spiritual 
transformation. Such findings are directly in line 
with the intuitions of transpersonal psychology 
founder Maslow (1970), who held the opinion 
"that the common base for all religions is human, 
natural, empirical, and that the so-called spiritual 
values are also naturally derivable" (p. 4). Taylor's 
(2016) approach is somewhat of an inversion of 
Maslow's: he has claimed that a naturalistically 
demonstrable phenomenon is partial empirical 
evidence for a metaphysically-based spiritual vision. 
 A strength of Taylor's (2016) approach 
is that he has set out to ground his concepts in 
phenomenology. Among various weaknesses, some 
already noted elsewhere (Hartelius, 2016, 2017), 
are flaws in Taylor's approach to phenomenology, 
and indeed to scientific processes of evidence more 
generally. Phenomenology, in the Husserlian tradition, 
is an approach that attempts to ground science in 
the fully accessible appearances that occur in direct 
experience—what Kant had termed phenomena—
rather than things-in-themselves, the more elusive 
noumena. Husserl wished this to be a philosophical 
method without prejudices or prior metaphysical 
commitments (Pivčević, 1970/2014). As such, a 
phenomenological approach typically requires that 
one's preexisting beliefs or assumptions be identified 
and actively set aside, or bracketed. This step is not 
one that Taylor appears to have pursued with any 
thoroughness.
 For example, in Taylor's (2012) paper, 
Spontaneous Awakening Experiences: Beyond Reli-
gion and Spiritual Practice, he examined various 
terms that might be applied to the particular type 
of transformative experience he was reporting on, 
rejecting both spiritual experience and mystical 
experience as too closely associated with religion. 
Taylor (2012) found Maslow's term, peak experience, 
more satisfactory, but then offered awakening 
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experience as a "psychologically more neutral" term (p. 
88). The difficulty here is that Taylor's term, though 
less associated with religious contexts, is not neutral; 
in fact, it is specifically resonant with his preexisting 
beliefs that certain nonordinary experiences provide 
access to a higher state of consciousness and a truer 
perception of reality (Taylor, 2005, 2010), reflecting 
his metaphysical commitments to a philosophy and 
cosmology that he has not made any obvious efforts to 
set aside. This is just the opposite of what is required 
in phenomenology, or in scientific work. 
 There are many forms of phenomenological 
research, but this example of Taylor's (2012) research 
would appear to have been designed to confirm 
preexisting beliefs about a particulary type of 
experience deemed to exist across cultures; that he 
did not identify and bracket his prior beliefs suggests 
a lack of the rigor that would encourage confidence 
in his findings. In this light, it is difficult to accept 
Taylor's (2016) claim that an approach such as his 
allows "a conceptual framework to emerge organically 
from the study of experience rather than interpreting 
experiences in terms of a preexisting framework" (p. 
38). While Taylor's approach of collecting accounts 
of a particular type of experience outside of religious 
settings is potentially of value to psychology, an 
apparent confirmation bias limits the reliability of his 
research to date in this area, and raises concerns about 
the psychological neutrality of his preferred term, 
awakening experiences. To his credit, Taylor (2017a) 
has acknowledged some of the shortcomings of his 
earlier research and has attempted to address these 
issues in more recent research.
 Yet the failure of evidence for a perennialist 
model is not dependent on Taylor's methodology. 
Even if his phenomenological research practices were 
impeccable, his findings would not serve as any kind of 
evidence that certain states of consciousness are higher, 
nor that they provide a more accurate experience of 
reality—which by implication would seem to situate 
Taylor's own type of nonordinary experiences as 
privileged insights into the nature of reality. These 
latter are metaphysical claims simply because it is hard 
to imagine any empirical way of demonstrating their 
validity. Taylor's (2016) perennial phenomenology, 
as he has termed his approach, seems to argue that 
because his phenomenological results are logically 
consistent with his perennialist schema, they must 
constitute at least partial evidence for the correctness 
of that frame. This is not the case, of course, since 
any number of interpretive frames might be consistent 
with the same empirical facts, not all or any of which 
would be necessarily true; in scientific work, evidence 
is held to a considerably higher standard. 
 Taylor's version of a descending perennialism 
(Hartelius, 2017) may be inspiring as a meaning 
frame, but it is not based on credible evidence any 
more than other forms of perennialism. Despite these 
problems, there may be some quite important human 
developmental phenomenon that his work has touched 
on. The fact that he has conflated evidence for a type of 
experience with evidence for the metaphysical schema 
he has extrapolated to explain such experiences should 
not distract from the real potential value of this line of 
inquiry. Perhaps Taylor's future work in this area will 
be able to make a stronger contribution.
Common Characteristics of 
Perennialist New Age Religions
Having reviewed three versions of contemporary perennialism it becomes possible to suggest that 
these share common properties. The utility of such a 
characterization may be in aiding in the recognition of 
this type of phenomenon, so that as new forms of this 
genre are created it becomes easier to recognize these 
as contributions to spiritual visions rather than to a 
psychology of spirituality. Seven characteristics have been 
identified as shared by the three examples: (1) an implied 
claim of privileged knowledge concerning the nature of 
reality; (2) a single dimension, experience, or phenomenon 
as the source of all spiritual experience or goal of all 
spiritual striving; (3) a universalized spirituality based on 
recontextualized appropriations from spiritual traditions; 
(4) other views or experiences characterized as distortions 
of the one true view or one authentic type of experience; 
(5) reliant on metaphysical claims; (6) evidence for a 
particular phenomenon is advanced as evidence for a 
particular explanation of that phenomenon; (7) key terms 
are defined in nonstandard ways.
 The first three of these can be combined into the 
central vision of this approach to spirituality: revelation 
of privileged insight into the underlying spiritual 
nature of reality that provides for a true and unified 
understanding of both secular and spiritual phenomena. 
The subsequent four characteristics are necessary 
correlates of this vision, strategies required and justified 
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by its allegedly imperative truth. Taken together, these 
features are recognizable as more reflective of a New Age 
religious movement than of a psychology, or any other 
scientific or scholarly field. 
 Wilber's version of perennialism is in some 
senses a foundation for what has come to be called New 
Age religion: systems of belief and practice that include 
holism and interconnectedness, a unified worldview, a 
universalized spirituality based on appropriation and 
recontextualization of content from spiritual traditions, 
an evolutionary perspective, a blurring of psychology and 
spirituality, a focus on subjective experience, a mystical 
idea of the inner self, and a belief in the imminent 
dawning of a new and better era of human existence 
(Flere & Kirbiš, 2009; Hammer, 2001; Hanegraaff, 
2009; Heelas, 1996). Studstill's (2005) and Taylor's 
(2016) works are also resonant with this genre.
 Whether advanced in a psychology context, 
as with Taylor (2016), or within the scholarship of 
mysticism, as with Studstill (2005), or as a new form of 
scholarship across multiple fields, as with Wilber (2000a, 
2000b, 2006), these are more accurately described 
as religious visions attempting to acquire scientific 
credibility. In their locations as spiritual views of life and 
reality these may provide inspiration and meaning. As 
substitutes for science and scholarship, and specifically as 
some component of psychology, they deserve a wide and 
skeptical berth.
Transpersonal Alternatives
to New Age Spiritual Visions
The impulse to understand human spirituality, and to reach for a grasp of what different individuals 
and diverse communities may share in common or 
contribute from their unique location, is a worthy 
one—and it is only one of various things that a 
transpersonal approach may aspire to study. For such 
work there are a number of avenues available other 
than metaphysics or pattern reading or authoritarian 
claims: scientific methods (Friedman, 2002, 2015) 
that include transpersonally-informed anthropology 
(Laughlin, 2013), phenomenology and other qualitative 
methods (Anderson & Braud, 2011), and participatory 
research approaches (Ferrer, 2014), to name a few. Going 
forward, some of these might usefully be paired with 
neuroscience in ways that may bring fresh perspectives 
to the latter; given the extraordinary sensitivity of neural 
measurement techniques, it should be possible to gain 
valuable insights into how the body reflects complex 
states, and to determine how spiritual achievements 
in one tradition are different from or similar to those 
gained through practice in a different tradition. 
 In addition, studies of beliefs or practices 
situated within a metaphysically constructed cultural 
context, that also consider their possible hermeneutic or 
psychological value beyond that context (e.g., Gifford-
May & Thompson, 1994; Lancaster, 2015; Miovic & 
Newton, 2004), seem well within the scope of defensible 
transpersonal approaches so long as metaphysical claims 
are not intermingled with evidentiary claims. Were 
Wilber’s integral theory, Studstill's mystical pluralism, 
or Taylor's soft perennialism to claim status as a New 
Age religious vision, it seems reasonable that these could 
also be considered for their possible hermeneutical or 
psychological value as such. 
 The work of coming to an understanding 
of human spirituality that is psychologically sound, 
yet that does not reduce or reject its claims, remains 
challenging. Tart's (1972) and Varela's (1996) proposals 
toward state-specific scholarship remains a promising 
way forward, since religious teachings often derive 
from experiences in nonordinary states, and spiritual 
practices often cultivate such states. A state-specific 
approach might be able to situate religious claims within 
the context of related states of consciousness, just as 
scientific knowledge might be understood as associated 
with a rational cognitive state of mind. This would not 
provide an ultimate solution, since the relative value of 
insights from various states would necessarily remain 
a topic of debate, but it might locate various types of 
knowledge claims within their respective modes of 
mental functioning, which at least share commonality 
within the range of human experience.
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